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Abstract
The basic assumption of this article is that governance marks a departure from the two 
pillars of the project of modernity: representative democracy and legislative institutions. 
Governance, as a complex institutional phenomenon that goes far beyond participation, 
has significantly deconstructed the two main points of reference of modern democracy, 
that is, people and territory. Furthermore, its inclusive and open nature has not prevented 
the emergence of a dark side, made of exclusive modes: a theater without publicity. From 
the perspective of transformations, this article highlights the emergence of a changing 
and fluid normativity, one capable of adapting to the specificity and the variability of 
situations and processes, inevitably eclipsing the primacy of the legislation itself.
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Resumen
El supuesto básico de este artículo es que la gobernanza señala un alejamiento de 
los dos pilares del proyecto moderno: la democracia representativa y las instituciones 
legislativas. La gobernanza, como fenómeno institucional complejo, que va mucho mas 
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allá de la participación, ha desestructurado sensiblemente los dos principales puntos de 
referencia de la democracia moderna: pueblo y territorio. Su trato inclusivo y abierto 
no ha impedido el surgimiento de un lado oscuro, hecho de modos exclusivos: un teatro 
sin publicidad. Desde la perspectiva de las transformaciones este artículo pone en evi-
dencia la emergencia de una normatividad cambiante y fluida, capaz de adaptarse a las 
especificidad y a la variabilidad de situaciones y procesos, ofuscando inevitablemente la 
misma primacía de la legislación.
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Governance as a Soft Revolution
When we think of governance we usually tend to think of devices shared between 
the public and the private. We also think of less codified and more flexible modes of 
producing rules of conduct on the local, national, international and global planes. 
The vast literature on this topic has brought into focus the main characteristics of 
governance, usually comparing and contrasting it to the notion of ‘government’.1 
Moreover, it has brought attention to the different issues relating to it, above all that of 
the ‘democratic deficit’. Yet by focusing on ‘governance’, understood through its ideal-
typical characteristics as well as its actual phenomenology, the impact of its emergence 
on the nature of the modern institutional scene is generally overlooked. In the following 
pages a specific angle will be adopted in order to seek a path towards reform, a reform 
that is actually intrinsic to and implied by governance itself. As it will be argued, 
the latter notion does not adhere to a carefully and rationally designed model; this 
notwithstanding, it does contain a great potential for reform.
Viewed from such a perspective, governance itself can be considered a ‘soft revo-
lution’ because, all in modifying in depth the pre-existing political and institutional 
context, it has not openly attacked the supporting structures – i.e. the parliamentary 
1. J. N. Rosenau, E.-O. Czempiel, Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics, Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, Cambridge, 1992. Also see O. Treib, H. Baehr, G. Falkner, “Modes of Governance: Towards a Conceptual 
Clarification”, in Journal of European Public Policy, 14, 2007, pp. 1-20.
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and government institutions – and the rituals of electoral democracy on which the rep-
resentative system is built. So, while the idea of the complete survival of such structures 
endures, in point of fact the elements defining the phase in which they developed have 
considerably changed. Soft revolution, implied by ‘governance’, has transformed legal 
and political as well as national and international scenarios essentially through a frag-
mentation of the state, the materialization of which had once signalled the advent of a 
coherent conception of power. Thus a new era characterized by the “incompleteness of 
power” has seen the day.2 In it governance processes are crucial and, as in the Middle 
Ages analysed by Paolo Grossi, new “intermediate bodies” seem to flourish.3 
The Many Defies Faced by the Modern Political and Legal Project 
The basic coordinates of the modern political project are to be found in the emi-
nently representative nature of democracy, while the juridical coordinates are exempli-
fied, especially in Europe, by the primacy of statute law over the executive and judicial 
activities. The combination of representative democracy and legislation was particu-
larly especially tight in continental Europe, where the “written law shaped by the sov-
ereign proved to be co-essential to the very existence of [its] body politic.”4 The state 
used legislation as its main legal currency, in the shadow of the jus publicum europeum.5 
As Hobbes remarked, “[T]he common-wealth is the Legislator. But the Common-wealth 
is no Person, nor has capacity to do anything, but by the Representative, (that is, the 
Sovereign) and therefore the Sovereign is the sole Legislator.”6 
Of course the emergence of governance practices did not abruptly unsettle such 
a scheme. Some of the changes were gradual and were related to that unrestrainable 
process of challenges to representative democracy that a vast literature has analysed 
from different angles.7 Similarly, the downsizing of legislative institutions gradually 
2. P. Grossi, L’ordine giuridico medievale, Laterza, Roma-Bari, 1997, and Id., Europa del diritto, Laterza, Roma-Bari, 2007.
3. Grossi makes the case that the incompleteness of power generates the “proliferation of intermediate societies”; see P. 
Grossi, Europa del diritto, p. 17. 
4. P. G. Monateri, Geopolitica del diritto. Genesi, governo e dissoluzione dei corpi politici, Laterza, Roma-Bari, 2013, p. 111.
5. C. Schmitt, Der Nomos der Erde. im Völkerrecht des Ius Publicum Europaeum, Greven, Köln, 1950, and P.P. Portinaro, La 
crisi dello Jus publicum europaeum. Saggio su Carl Schmitt, Edizioni di Comunità, Milano, 1982.
6. T. Hobbes, Leviathan, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996, p. 184 (chap. 26).
7. It suffice to refer, here, to B. Manin, Principes du gouvernement représentatif, Calmann-Lévy, Paris, 1995. Also see: N. 
Urbinati, Representative Democracy: Principles and Genealogy, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2006; Lo scettro 
senza il re. Partecipazione e rappresentanza nelle democrazie moderne, Donzelli, Roma, 2009, and see also Democrazia rap-
presentativa. Sovranità e controllo dei poteri, Donzelli, Roma, 2010; Democrazia in diretta. Le nuove sfide alla rappresentanza, 
Feltrinelli, Milano, 2013.
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took place throughout the twentieth century, when the weight of the executives grew 
at the expense of the legislative power. That weight has further increased in connection 
with globalization processes.8 But governance produces one more double distancing: 
of democracy from its capacity to represent the people, and of law from the legislative 
process itself. This stems from the profound incompatibility of governance practices 
with the two pillars of the modern political project.
The representative idea of democracy was consistent with the emergence of mass 
politics and with a political culture that did not distinguish between the ‘I’ and the ‘us’. 
Moreover, it was incompatible with the notion of ‘intermediate societies’. In the main, 
it was used to offer to a political majority a strong decision-making capacity, necessary 
to adequately tackle the issues pertaining to the collective social and economic life. In 
Europe, the idea of representative democracy, pivoting around the opposition between 
majority and minority, showed at the beginning a sharp penchant towards the ma-
jority, which was considered decisive and even, in cases, was assimilated to unanimity 
itself.9 But Kelsen already renames the majority principle in terms of a ‘majority-mi-
nority’ dichotomy, since that the entire parliamentary procedure is based on the idea of 
a ‘compromise’ between majority and minority.10 Now, over time, the relationship be-
tween majorities and minorities has undergone several transformations,11 to the point 
of establishing the paradox that democracies that rely on are undemocratic. In other 
words, in the too vast majorities political sphere, at a time when the interest towards 
‘majoritarian democracy’ was increasing, the importance to be assigned to minorities 
groups and individuals as a mark of good democratic practices has increased. From a 
different perspective, representative democracy definitely had an elitist penchant, since 
it entrusted the mandate largely to the ‘conscience’ of the representatives themselves.12 
These could dispose of it freely and without constraints – a fact that, in turn, reflected 
the existence of a gap, theoretical if not actual, between voters and elected. 
8. For example, Saskia Sassen makes the case that “[I]n the United States the state tightened its power function, even as 
other parts of the government lost power”: S. Sassen, Territory, Authority, Rights, Princeton University Press, Princeton 
(N.J.), 2006, p. 162. 
9. On this point, see P. Rosanvallon, La légitimité démocratique. Impartialité, réflexivité, proximité, Seuil, Paris, 2009. See 
especially chap. 1. 
10. H. Kelsen, Vom Wesen unt Wert der Demokratie2, J.B.C. Mohr, Tübingen, 1929, p. 53
11. On this issue, besides Rosanvallon’s book referred to in note 28, see also E. Ruffini, Il principio maggioritario, Adelphi, 
Milano, 1976, and A. Pizzorusso, Minoranze e maggioranze, Einaudi, Torino, 1993. Also see F. Galgano, La forza del numero 
e la legge della ragione. Storia del principio di maggioranza, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2007.
12. See, for example, A. Pizzorno, ‘Introduzione’, in A. Pizzorno, (ed.), La democrazia di fronte allo stato. Una discussione 
sulle difficoltà della politica moderna, Feltrinelli, Milano, 2010. 
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The specificity of the European scenario forces us to come to terms with the differ-
ent Anglo-Saxon and especially American context.13 There, the consistency itself of the 
‘body politic’ is different and incomparable to what Hobbes represented through the 
mythical Leviathan and that was encapsulated by Schmitt in the notion of “the autono-
my of the political”, that is, of “its absolute intensity and its qualitatively uniqueness.”14 
On this point, suffice it to consider on the one hand how in the United States the ma-
joritarian culture has grown weaker and, on the other, how the legal physiognomy of 
American democracy has been entrusted mainly to the judge-made law, rather than 
to the legislation.15 The United States has always been inclined to challenge the idea of 
representative democracy, and has shown a clear penchant towards the principle and 
practices of the binding mandate.16 Yet even in Europe, already before the advent of 
modern governance, that model had been affected in various ways by different social 
and political movements and impulses. First and foremost, there was the tendency to-
wards Caesarism, a phenomenon already identified by Weber as a germ lingering within 
the modern body politic and impinging its rationality.17 The proliferation of populist18 
and personalistic drives19 represents a hidden risk for the representative capacity of 
democracy in our own time. But even the different elitist conceptions of democracy, 
which have brought the focus onto the competition between elites, as in Schumpeter’s 
reading,20 or on ‘poliarchy’ as Dahl has understood it,21 contributed to minimize the 
actual representative value. No less significant challenges to the notion and the pro-
cess of representation stemmed from the increasing social complexity and from the 
underlying network of interests characterizing the postmodern society.22 The increasing 
13. On this, see P. Monateri, Geopolitica del diritto, Laterza, Roma-Bari, 2013. Also see M. R. Ferrarese, La governance tra 
politica e diritto, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2010.
14. See C. Galli, Genealogia della politica. Carl Schmitt e la crisi del pensiero politico moderno, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2010, p. 
737.
15. U. Mattei, Il modello di common law, Giappichelli, Torino, 1996.
16. So, referring to America, Tocqueville noted that “very frequently the electors, having elected their delegate, will lay down 
a plan of behaviors and will impose upon him a certain number of positive commitments in could in no way avoid”, A. de 
Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Penguin, London, 2003, p. 288.
17. The famous Weberian distinction between traditional, legal-rational and charismatic power in M. Weber, Economy and 
Society. An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, University of California Press, Berkeley–Los Angeles–London, 1978, pp. 212-
301, carries within the idea of an implicit combination of these three forms, especially between the charismatic and the 
legal-rational power. See G. Rebuffa, Nel crepuscolo della democrazia, Il Mulino, Bologna, 1991.
18. Y. Meny and Y. Surel, Par le peuple, pour le peuple. Le populisme et les démocraties, Fayard, Paris, 2000. Also see the latest 
analysis by N. Urbinati, Democrazia sfigurata. Il popolo tra opinione e verità, Università Bocconi Editore, Milano, 2014, 
especially pp. 177 and ff.
19. M. Calise, Il partito personale. I due corpi del leader, Laterza, Roma-Bari, 2010.
20. J. A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, Allen and Unwin, London, 1943.
21. R. A. Dahl, Polyarchy. Participation and Opposition, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1971.
22. Yet Santi Romano, already in 1909, noted that the “progressive organization on the basis of the particular interests of 
society, which ever more loses its atomistic nature”, S. Romano, Lo stato moderno e la sua crisi. Discorso per l’inaugurazione 
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articulation of interests tended to be reflected in the sphere of political representation, 
transforming the representative into amere performer of increasingly more specific and 
partial mandates. This has led to the emergence, as for example in Italy, of the phenome-
non of ‘decoding’ and the swelling in number of laws made for favouring specific groups 
or individuals.23
Not surprisingly, in the 1980s neo-corporatism theories saw an increasing capacity 
of interests groups to undermine the fullness of the representative mandate, dividing 
it into a congeries of particularistic mandates.24 Even the ‘deliberative’ conception of 
democracy can be considered a precedent on the road leading to the crisis of representa-
tion.25 In fact, following Habermassian assumptions and focusing on public discussion 
as crucial to the democratic process, it contributed to shift the focus from top to bottom. 
Moreover, the many sub-varieties of deliberative democracy, which called attention to 
a plurality of deliberative forums and focus groups, essentially sought to counter rep-
resentative bodies. Finally, the hypothesis of an ‘electronic democracy’, already analysed 
by the existing literature,26 and examined and arrived at the Italian Parliament in 2013, 
is perhaps the most explicit challenge to the classical representative rationale.27 
Each one of these perspectives has produced effects within modern democracies, so 
that, it might be said, today different perspectives and components coexist. Elements 
of traditional representation, now almost residual, coexist with elements of corporate 
and lobbies representation, along with expressions of ‘deliberative’ democracy, but also 
with many other forms of ‘direct’ democracy. Correspondingly, law is pluralized into 
different ‘images’28 and various ‘truths’.29 
dell’anno accademico dell’Università di Pisa, Vannucchi, Pisa, 1909, p. 28.
23. N. Irti, L’età della decodificazione, Giuffrè, Milano, 1978, and L’età della decodificazione vent’anni dopo, Giuffrè, Milano, 
1999. 
24. On this issue, see P.C. Schmitter, Neo-corporatism and the State, European University Institute, Florence, 1984; E. Gual-
mini, Le rendite del neocorporativismo. Politiche pubbliche e contrattazione privata nel mercato tedesco e italiano, Rubbettino, 
Roma, 1997 and W. Streeck, The Study of Interest Groups: Before ‘the Century’ and After, in C. Crouck, W. Streeck (eds.), The 
Diversity of Democracy: Corporatism, Social Order and Political Conflict, Edward Elgar, London, 2006.
25. On the point, J. Elster (ed.), Deliberative Democracy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998. Also see J. Bohman, 
W. Rehg, Deliberative Democracy, The MIT Press, Cambridge (Mass.), 1997, and L. Bobbio, “Democrazia dei cittadini e 
democrazia deliberativa”, in Cosmopolis, 8, 2013. Also see A. Floridia, La democrazia deliberativa. Teorie, processi e sistemi, 
Carocci, Roma, 2012.
26. Besides S. Rodotà, Tecnopolitica. La democrazia e le nuove tecnologie della comunicazione, Laterza, Roma-Bari, 2004, also 
see D. Pittèri, Democrazia elettronica, Laterza, Roma-Bari, 2007, and G. Tocci, Governance urbana e democrazia elettronica, 
Rubettino, Roma, 2006.
27. See R. Biorcio, P. Natale, Politica a 5 stelle. Idee, storia e strategie del movimento di Grillo, Feltrinelli, Milano, 2013, and S. 
Rodotà, Il mondo nella rete. Quali i diritti, quali i vicoli, Laterza, Roma-Bari, 2014.
28. A. Tucci, Immagini del diritto. Tra fattualità istituzionalistica e agency, Giappichelli, Torino, 2012.
29. F. Mancuso, Le ‘verità’ del diritto. Pluralismo dei valori e legittimità, Giappichelli, Torino, 2013.
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Democracy and Governance: Coinciding or Diverging Scenarios?
The impact of governance on the representative nature of democracy has been par-
ticularly incisive in at least two ways. First, governance has substantially deconstructed 
the two main references of modern democracy, that is, ‘people’ and ‘territory’. Conse-
quently, the scenarios of governance and democracy no longer coincide with one an-
other as regards the territory or the people. Second, the highlighting of the ‘inclusive’ 
character governance,30 which characterizes it as a mode of government open and re-
assuring, has helped hide a darker side of governance, made of ‘exclusive’ rather than 
‘inclusive’ modes. I will consider this second cause of divergence between democracy 
and governance in the following section. Now, let us concentrate on the first reason of 
dissociation.
The dissociation of governance from people and territory has not adequately been 
examined by the existing literature. If democracy might be defined as “a government of all 
and for all adult individuals with no other distinction; individuals who live closely togeth-
er or co-exist in a given space and give themselves specific laws as if they were strangers 
to one other”,31 one can see that in the notion itself of state there was an “aspect of unre-
latedness and artificiality” 32 that paralleled the general and abstract character of the laws. 
Although territory and people may appear as concrete entities, it was precisely the modern 
state that disembodied them by neutralizing corporate orders – as noted by Grossi.33
The detachment from people and territory produced by governance entails getting 
closer to less artificial entities. In this sense, it is part of a broader movement towards 
more ‘natural’ actions, motives, and laws.34 Foucault brilliantly understood the factors 
that could deconstruct the two entities. In passing, it is worth noting that until the 
sixteenth century populations and individuals were merely “variables par rapport au 
30. Inclusiveness, understood as the participation of private individuals to public decisions, is analysed as a distinctive trait 
of governance (together with ‘effectiveness’ and ‘interactivity’) in M. R. Ferrarese, La governance tra politica e diritto, pp. 
51 and ff.
31. This is the definition offered by N. Urbinati, Democrazia in diretta, p. 22.
32. Ibid., p. 23.
33. Grossi stresses the importance of the annihilation of corporative bodies brought about in 1789 by Le Chapelier’s decree, 
and the subversion that the abstract notion of equality produced on “the notion of political representation”: P. Grossi, 
L’Europa del diritto, p. 131.
34. On this, N. Irti, L’uso giuridico della natura, Laterza, Roma-Bari, 2013. On the complex relationship and entangle 
between nature and art, see A. Catania, F. Mancuso (eds.), Natura e artificio. Norme, corpi e soggetti tra politica e diritto, 
Mimesis, Milano, 2011, and especially L. Bazzicalupo, “Dalla natura all’artificio e ritorno. Un breve circuito a proposito di 
norma”, pp. 11-24. Laura Bazzicalupo, furthermore, discusses the notion of ‘naturalized capitalism’ in her ‘L’immaginario 
della crisi e lo spettro del cambiamento: Falso movimento’, in L. Bazzicalupo, A. Tucci (eds.), Il grande crollo. È possibile 
un governo della crisi economica?, Mimesis, Milano, 2010, pp. 15-34. Also see D. Carusi, L’ordine naturale delle cose, Giap-
pichelli, Torino, 2011.
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territoire.”35 It was in a 1555 work36 that Foucault sought the traces of a different con-
ception of government, one that was inspired by the Christian pastorate and which he 
called “gouvernamentalité”. Far from being based on the principle of common good, 
it was a notion construed around the idea of “fin convenable”, implying a “plurality of 
specific ends.”37 It is no coincidence that this conception has often been juxtaposed with 
that of governance.
In the literature concerning globalization, much attention has been devoted to the 
restructuring of spaces, even in the legal sense,38 rather than the restructuring of ‘territo-
ry’ and ‘people’ as such.39 Among exception is the work by Saskia Sassen, who addresses 
the issue of territory by deconstructing its meaning. After a long historical excursion, 
Sassen reaches the conclusion that “key dynamics of the current transformation tend 
toward disaggregation, in a reversal of the earlier period that saw the formation of the 
nation-state.”40 According to Giddens, ‘disassembling’ is a key word in the moderniza-
tion process,41 but it gains a new significance in the global political and institutional 
dynamic: “Disassembling the national” becomes the guideline of a spatial restructuring 
that rejects the classic divide between national and international as well as that between 
public and private.42 Through the creation of so-called “transnational networks”,43 and 
“multiple for a for scientific, cultural and business communities and the formation of 
international private organizations,”44  the new world of governance comes into being. 
Its political rationality rejects measurable and intangible quantities – as were people and 
territory – and inaugurates an “unprecedented compatibility of heterogeneous elements 
– so different from the coherence sought after by modern legal systems.”45 Through 
governance, in short, a new mode of flexible and decentralized government is assert-
ed, one that does not explicitly deal with problems in general and abstract terms, but 
35. M. Foucault, Sécurité, territoire, population. Cours au Collège de France 1977-1978, Gallimard-Seuil, Paris, 2004, p. 99.
36. Reference is to de La Perrière’s Miroir politique, one of the works that animated the debate ensuing the publication of 
Machiavelli’s Principe. The work is referred to and examined by Foucault in his Sécurité, territoire, population, pp. 94 and ff. 
37. M. Foucault, Sécurité, territoire, population, p. 102.
38. See, for example, S. Cassese, Lo spazio giuridico globale, Laterza, Roma-Bari, 2002, and M.R. Ferrarese, Diritto sconfinato. 
Inventiva giuridica e spazi nel mondo globale, Laterza, Roma-Bari, 2006. 
39. On the issue of territory, see A. Di Martino, Il territorio: dallo stato-nazione alla globalizzazione. Sfide e prospettive dello 
stato costituzionale aperto, Giuffrè, Milano, 2010.
40. S. Sassen, Territory, Authority, Rights, p. 7.
41. A. Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, Polity, Cambridge, 1990.
42. S. Sassen, Territory, Authority, Rights, pp. 143 and ff.
43. On this, see A.M. Slaughter, The Real New World Order, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2004. On the importance 
of networking and joining-up processes for democratic governance, see M. Bevir, Democratic Governance, Princeton Uni-
versity Press, Princeton, 2010, pp. 183 and ff.
44. S. Sassen, Territory, Authority, Rights, p. 151.
45. A. Tucci ‘(Dis)aggregazioni’, in A. Tucci (ed.), Disaggregazioni. Forme e spazi di governance, Mimesis, Milano-Udine, 
2013, p. 11.
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faces them with interventions pursuing specific targets and addressing specific recipients. 
This also means that “numerous actors construct governance differently as they oper-
ate  against the background of diverse traditions.”46 People and territory, because of their 
unitary and indivisible character, are no longer functional, and, without being  openly 
questioned, become the object of a reworking and partial deactivation. Every specific 
governance process builds different parts of ‘people’ and ‘territory’ to meet the needs of 
different recipients. Furthermore, this does not necessarily deploy itself within the bound-
aries of the state. Indeed, as it is well known, governance processes that take place under 
the banner of international organizations are increasingly crucial in shaping the political 
face of our world.47 In this sense, governance is linked to the process of re-invention and 
multiplication of spaces through a network-like legal organization typical of globaliza-
tion,48 taking on a horizontal rather than a vertical dimension,49 and presenting a sort of 
‘marbled’ aspect, with lines and colours intersecting in complex ways.50
The undoing of people and territory implemented by governance processes shows 
a clear deviation from the arithmetic approach to democracy which was based on the 
opposition between majority and minority. It is a significant challenge to it. Since it 
becomes necessary to offer articulated legal answers to the complex network of needs 
of individuals and groups, then it is the concept of ‘sociological minorities’ that 
comes into play, rather than that of ‘political minorities’.51 The dichotomy majority/
minority is irrelevant to governance. As a matter of, governance actually contributes 
to concealing it, all in working effectively to further the rights of minority groups. In 
doing so, it encourages the emergence of new types of ‘intermediate bodies’, favouring 
anti-majoritarian tendencies. Moreover, in this direction, governance is paralleled by 
constitutionalism, which assigns a prominent position to the guarantee of fundamental 
rights of individual, groups and minorities,52 and makes of these an insurmountable 
limit to politics, to the point of establishing a sphere of ‘undecidability’.53 
46. M. Bevir, Democratic governance, p. 86.
47. On global governance, see J.L. Dunoff and J.P. Trachtman (eds.), Constitutionalism, international Law and Global Go-
vernance, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009.
48. See F. Ost, M. van de Kerchove, De la pyramide au réseau? Pour une théorie dialectique du droit, Publications des Facultés 
Universitaires Saint-Louis, Bruxelles, 2002.
49. M. R. Ferrarese, “Il diritto orizzontale. L’ordinamento giuridico globale secondo Sabino Cassese”, in Politica del diritto, 
2, 2007, pp. 639-652.
50. Cassese uses this image in his book The Global Polity: Global Dimensions of Democracy and the Rule of Law, Global Law 
Press, Sevilla, 2012.
51. On the point, A. Pizzorusso, Minoranze e maggioranze.
52. See M. R. Ferrarese, La governance tra politica e diritto, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2010, pp. 103 and ff.
53. On this, see L. Ferrajoli, La democrazia attraverso i diritti, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 2013. 
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Governance: A Theatre Without Publicity
On a national and international level, the detachment of people and territory imple-
mented by the processes of governance manifests itself through the incessant produc-
tion of ever new decision-making scenarios concerning various topics and involving 
different actors who maintain varying relationships with the government. Speaking of 
‘scenarios’ helps emphasize the existence of a contradictory relationship between gov-
ernance and a specific theatrical genre of which it represents, at once, an elation and a 
rejection. In fact, on the one hand governance might be understood as a sort of travel-
ling theatre, which assembles its scenes each time in a different way, in different places, 
using different pieces and even different actors for each performance. On the other 
hand, it largely relinquishes the ‘public’ character so typical of theatre performances, 
especially of travelling theatres. In the past, classic state institutions, and especially the 
parliament, considered a theatricality that coincided with publicity to be their hallmark. 
When Bagehot evoked the theatrical nature of the British Parliament, assigning to it a 
crucial role in educating the citizens, he was referring to the public character of that 
institution.54 With governance, we find ourselves facing a theatricality that is disasso-
ciated from full publicity. The latter is variable, and in any case is smaller than that 
of government, that is, of classics state institutions. Theatricality, understood as an 
act performed ‘publicly’ and endowed with meaningful symbolic character, is simply 
absent. So, beyond the democratic deficit produced by governance so often pointed 
at by the existing literature, a decrease of the symbolic capacity of the fora engaged in 
strictly functional decision-making processes should also be noted.
A vast European literature, starting from Hobbes, has accustomed us to considering 
the state as an entity endowed with symbolic and mystical meanings,55 mysterious,56 and 
full of theological connotations.57 The strong functionalist impression of governance 
breaks this narrative of the state and its institutions. The symbolic elements become less 
evident. It might be argued that repeated calls for ‘transparency’ coming from 
54. “The distinguishing quality of Parliamentary Government is, that in each stage of a public transaction there is a dis-
cussion; that the public assist at this discussion; that it can, through Parliament, turn out an administration which is not 
doing as it likes, and can put in an administration which will do as it likes” W. Bagehot, The English Constitution, Oxford 
University Press, London, 1873, p. 34. 
55. The issue has been examined from a Durkheimian viewpoint by P. Bourdieu, Sur l’État. Cours au Collège de France 
(1989-1992), Seuil, Paris, 2012.
56. E. H. Kantorovicz, The King’s Two Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 
1995.
57. C. Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, 1996.
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international governance play a surrogate role, and represent a legitimizing mechanism, 
to the traditional symbolic role of the state. The ‘eye of the law’ is no longer watching.58 
On the contrary, it requires that both subjects and practices become visible by asking them, 
for example, to fight corruption through internal mechanisms,59 always ready to meet with 
a searching eye. In this sense, governance is a further step on the road to secularization and 
the loss of the theological and mystical character of public institutions.
Governance is shaped around an economic rationale. It is no coincidence that Ag-
amben speaks of an “economic theology” that has taken the place of the “political theol-
ogy”. If the latter expressed itself through the “legislative omnipotence”, the “economic 
theology” mirrors the rationale of the oikonomia understood as “the running of the 
household” which calls for “decisions and arrangements for facing each time specific 
problems that concern the functional order (taxis) of the various parts of the oikos.”60 
It is this essentially domestic and managerial nature of global governance, no longer re-
sponding to any episteme, that renders it seemingly effective and, by such a token, ends 
hiding its political nature and its explicitly ideological approach to the interpretation 
and solution of problems.
Governance Between Inclusions…
Governance is often seen as the hallmark of a new form of democracy ‘from 
below’ called ‘participative’ democracy.61 Its tight relationship with participation has 
contributed to understanding governance primarily as a means of strengthening 
democracy and as a specific decision-making mode with unprecedented ‘inclusive’ 
capacities. Governance practices have multiplied in number, while the ensuing processes 
of participation have allowed a variety of public and private stakeholders to partake to 
public decisions. Individuals might represent the different needs of citizens, groups, 
professional associations, business enterprises, NGOs and social movements of various 
kinds. Public subjects include states, regions, different types of judicial bodies, and 
especially international networks and organizations. Such an enlarged participation has 
58. M. Stolleis, Das Auge des Gesetzes: Geschichte einer Metapher, C.H. Beck Verlag, München, 2004. 
59. See the interesting work by A. Garapon, P. Servan-Schreiber (eds.), Deals de justice. Le marché américain de l’obéissance 
mondialisée, PUF, Paris, 2013.
60. G. Agamben, Il regno e la gloria. Per una genealogia teologica dell’economia e del governo, Neri Pozza, Firenze, 2007, p. 31. 
61. See D. Held, Models of Democracy, Polity, Cambridge, 1987, and M. Paci, Welfare locale e democrazia partecipativa, Il 
Mulino, Bologna, 2008; also see U. Allegretti, La democrazia partecipativa. Esperienze e prospettive in Italia e in Europa, 
Firenze University Press, Firenze, 2010.
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played an essential role in presenting governance as an inclusive and welcoming mode 
of rule, one admitting a greater number and a wider variety of actors than those that 
representative democracy allowed for. This, it meets the expectations of a new form of 
democracy capable of giving a voice to actors who, in the past, where at the margins of 
society. International governance also allows and encourages the introduction of new 
levels of participation, marking the entry of civil society in public decision-making 
processes not only in societies that have scarce familiarity with democratic practices, 
but also in countries with longer democratic traditions.
Participation in governance processes can be of various kinds. They may encom-
pass various procedures and different levels and types of government (local, national, 
international and global). They might involve law-making, regulatory, judicial, or dis-
putes-settlement processes by ‘quasi-judicial’ bodies. It might even be possible to con-
ceive of a form of ‘participation rights’ that are, however, particularly varied, protean 
and in most instances not invokable before a judge. As suggested by Cassese, these are 
scattered in a sort of ‘labyrinth’ in which it is particularly difficult to extricate oneself. 
Furthermore, “the divide between participation and consultation, participation and 
negotiation, participation and co-operation are far from clear”; emerging, here, is the 
continuity, if not the identification, of participation and negotiation.62
In particular, participation has been promoted by major international organizations. 
The World Bank has made  participation a key requirement for countries receiving its 
economic aid, with the aim of involving communities and citizens and rendering them, 
to some extent, co-deciders of the measures adopted. Participation in decision-making 
encourages the introduction of new levels of democratic participation, especially in 
countries unfamiliar with democratic practices. At the same time, participation allows 
stakeholders to play a decisive role in public decision-making processes. This has been 
the most significant institutional outcome attained by a long cultural campaign con-
ducted in the last decades of the twentieth century, a campaign demanding a new role 
for citizens and their full involvement in decision-making processes as signs of a truer 
democracy. All this lay in continuity with an American tradition. In the United States, 
voice was given to ‘public interest’ already in the 1970s thanks to the so-called public in-
terest movements.63 These, rather than speaking of ‘general and abstract’ notions, represented 
a form of lobbying for the people. In other words, in the United States issues concerning 
62. S. Cassese, The Global Polity, p. 160.
63. See E. S. Clemens, The People’s Lobby. Organizational Innovation and the Rise of Interest Group Politics, The University 
of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1997.
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the public interest have emerged through lobby-like organizations and mobilizations. 
Indeed, the actions of lobbies themselves have often been interpreted as an ‘act of rep-
resentation’.64
…and Exclusions
Governance implies, therefore, a kind of political and legal organization that requires 
a high capacity of mobilization mainly based on interest. However, neither all parties 
nor all societies possess such an aptitude in equal measure, since this is derived from 
cognitive, informational and entrepreneurial abilities that are unequally distributed. 
It is not difficult to realize that, in this type of organization, large organized interests 
with great resources and with strong pressure capabilities are particularly favoured. 
It is no coincidence that Europe has chosen to pursue the path of subsidiarity in order 
to create a positive integration between the ability of subjects to mobilize and the ability 
of public institutions to make up for their deficiency.65
There is, therefore, somesort of ambivalence with regards to governance processes 
and their relationship with democracy. This is clearly shown by the fact that the liter-
ature on the topic is divided between the celebration of the participation surplus that 
it promotes and the legitimacy deficit it suffers. Following von Hayeck,66 neoliberal 
thinkers have discredited all great political projects and economic planning as a sign of 
authoritarian politics taking away from individuals and civil society efficiency, initia-
tive, vitality and freedom. Governance coincides with the crisis of politics and political 
parties,67 that is, the collectors of political demands. It mirrors a version of politics that 
renounces to pursue grand projects, limiting itself to facilitate the implementation of 
several small projects born within civil society. The transition from politics as a general 
and all-encompassing project for society, based on an ideal type, to a policy essential-
ly construed as a managerial activity pursuing specific targets and operated by sub-
jects driven by interests, is a crucial point in understanding the modes of inclusion and 
exclusion of governance processes.
64. See J. M. Berry, Lobbying for the People, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1977, p. 5.
65. See M. Cartabia, N. Lupo, A. Simoncini (eds.), Democracy and Subsidiarity in the EU National Parliaments: Regions and 
Societies in the Decision-making Process, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2013, and especially A. Simoncini, “Beyond Representative 
Democracy: The Challenge of Participatory Democracy and the Boundless Galaxy of Civil Society”, pp. 45-73.
66. F. A. von Hayeck, The Road to Serfdom, Routledge, London, 2001.
67. G. Preterossi, La politica negata, Laterza, Roma-Bari, 2011, and Id., “Crisi economica globale e spoliticizzazione”, in L. 
Bazzicalupo, A. Tucci (eds.), Il grande crollo, pp. 85-92.
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The participatory dimension of governance is not so generalized and salvific as it may 
seem prima facie. The entrance of civil society–or rather of some of its components–in 
the realm of government implies a (more or less pronounced) privatization of public 
decision-making. Governance is not easily reconciled with representative democracy and 
with its own promise of a ‘general and abstract’ inclusion. In a way, inclusion through 
participation is always ‘particular and concrete’. Indeed, this form of participation in the 
decision-making clearly implies an exclusion since the decision itself is no longer tied to 
a mandate relating to major political issues affecting the entire community or significant 
parts of it. On the contrary, it pertains to problems of specific groups or of local commu-
nities or even single persons. Thus it follows specific inputs. Moreover, the call for partic-
ipation in governance processes, along with the values  proper to the notion of democracy 
‘from below’, promotes a transformation of citizens into stakeholders with regards to spe-
cific issues. Therefore it promotes a version of the public decision as an ‘arena’ in which 
participants are allowed to enter because of their particular and egoistic interests.68
Governance is a complex institutional phenomenon that transcends participation. First, 
it implies, beyond the privatization of the decision-making process, significant outsourcing 
of several public functions.69 When considering ‘governance’, it is therefore necessary to 
consider not only decision modes that are open to the participation of private entities, but 
also the actual outcomes of the delegation to private subjects of functions that in the past 
were carried out by the state. In other words, private subjects manage many tasks that were 
once considered to be public. Here we find ourselves in a particularly sensitive area, where 
governance may have significant consequences on a people’s fundamental rights and might 
deeply affect the distribution of resources within society. Let us consider, for example, the 
consequences of privatization in at least three sensitive areas: the entrepreneurial conduct of 
transnational corporations operating in countries without regulations protecting labourers 
nor the environment;70 the privatization of prisons that, particularly in the United States, has 
led to a significant reduction of the protection of inmate rights; the governance of financial 
markets, where phenomena of ‘moral hazard’ have had devastating effects.71
68. See S. Cassese, La crisi dello stato, especially pp. 20 and ff. and pp. 74 and ff., where the notion of ‘public arena’ is exami-
ned in some detail. The image of the public arena is also used in D. Cefai, “Qu’est ce qu’une arène publique? Quelques pistes 
pour une perspective pragmatiste”, in D. Cefai, I. Joseph (eds.), L’héritage du pragmatism. Conflits d’urbanité et épreuves de 
civisme, Editions de l’Aube, Paris, 2002, pp. 51-83.
69. A. C. Aman Jr., “Politics, Policy and Outsourcing in the United States: The Role of Administrative Law”, in L. Pearson, 
C. Harlow, M. Taggart (eds.), Administrative Law in a Changing State: Essays in Honour of Mark Aronson, Hart Publishing, 
Oxford, 2008, pp. 205-221.
70. See P. Zumbansen, “Lochner Disembedded: The Anxieties of Law in a Global Context”, in Indiana Journal of Global 
Legal Studies, 20, 2013, pp. 1-28.
71. R. A. Posner, A Failure of Capitalism: The Crisis of ‘08 and the Descent into Depression, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 
49
In other words, governance might be considered an opportunity for new forms of 
democratic commitment for citizens, groups, and various subjects; however it might 
also represent a new form of democratic disengagement inasmuch as the privatization 
of decisions implies a rejection of the social responsibility criteria, endangering the fun-
damental rights of individuals. Furthermore, the reference to single issues, mostly of 
a local and particularistic nature, contributes to a general de-politicization of society, 
hidingbroader political issues from the public eye. Governance management tasks, 
which are difficult to trace back to a coherent project, inevitably devour the idealistic 
and ideological charge of European politics.
With the collapse of grand projects and the end of ideological politics, governance 
marks the end of political conflict as well. Governance, in other words, is inherently 
pacifying, as Czempiel has noted.72 It might even be argued that governance constitutes 
a kind of insurance against conflict itself. First, this is the result of the involvement in 
decision-making of stakeholders, who thus become, to some extent, co-decision makers. 
Furthermore, major conflicts are expunged from the scenario of governance, or made 
less noticeable, through its division or localization. As Zumbansen has remarked, “gover-
nance conflicts are regularly disembedded by confining them to a particular context, 
governed by rules of competence and authority.”73 Obviously, every specific governance 
context has its own greater or smaller share of conflict which, however, is related to the 
specificities of the various contexts rather than to great political and ideological issues.
Governance might be considered a way of managing power based on ‘economic’ 
modes and aiming at ‘effectiveness’,74 that is, doing “things, without resorting to legal 
force.”75 It does not only seek solutions to problems through specific arrangements 
without engaging on the theoretical and ideological plane; it also sets up its responses 
to problems with the least possible expenditure of political resources. In this sense, “suc-
cess or failure, rather than legitimacy or illegitimacy, now become the criteria of govern-
mental action.”76 There is, therefore, an economy inherent to governance that consists 
(Mass.), 2009. On the relationship between financial crisis and governance processes, see M. R. Ferrarese, “La crisi finanziaria 
tra stati e mercati e il “mondo 3” dell’economia globale”, Democrazia e diritto, 3-4, 2012, pp. 15-40.
72. E.-O. Czempiel, “Governance and Democratization”, in J. N. Rosenau, E.-O. Czempiel (eds.), Governance without Go-
vernment, pp. 250-271.
73. P. Zumbansen, “Lochner Disembedded: The Anxieties of Law in a Global Context”, p. 5.
74. On the notion of ‘effectiveness’ see, A. Catania (ed.), Dimensioni dell’effettività. Tra teoria generale e politica del diritto, 
Giuffrè, Milano, 2005, and Id., Diritto positivo ed effettività, Editoriale Scientifica, Napoli, 2010 and Effettività e modelli nor-
mativi. Studi di filosofia del diritto, (published by Valeria Giordano). Also see A. Catania, Metamorfosi del diritto. Decisione 
e norma nell’età globale, Laterza, Roma-Bari, 2008.
75. E.-O. Czempiel, “Governance and Democratization”, p. 250. Also see O. R. Young, “The Effectiveness of International 
Institutions”, in J. N. Rosenau, E.-O. Czempiel (eds.), Governance without Government, pp. 160-194.
76. M. Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France. 1978-79, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2008, 
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in saving power and resources. On the one hand, ‘decision’, which in the past was a sign 
of political sovereignty entailing an expenditure of power up to the ultimate test of the 
Schmittian ‘state of exception’, with governance seems to become a co-decision. On the 
other hand, a large part of the costs of enforcement is reduced through the (greater or 
lesser) convenience that the co-deciders find in implementing the rules.
Considerably purified of the coercive disposition of power, governance appears to 
be part of a framework in which “sanctioning instruments and regulatory potentials 
typical of the states take place through a variable geometry, with very different degrees 
of effectiveness.”77 Governance might be identified with ‘governmentality’ as defined by 
Foucault, a soft mode of governance that relies on ‘regimes of truth’ that are, as much 
as possible, ‘natural’, that is, close to or coinciding with self-regulation. All behaviors, even 
those of governments, need to maintain flexibility and adaptability. In this way,  they turn 
into a kind of “exercise of possibilities”, even if they maintain a normative character–as 
noted by Bazzicalupo.78 The rules, therefore, are not given a priori, but are the result of 
negotiations and of adaptive behaviors that take into account the needs of the governed, 
following the model of the Christian pastorate.79 The results of the struggle are the re-
sults of the specific decisions and ways of being of the actors involved and of the different 
competitive environments. They enshrine the idea that “the living, as such, is in its 
immanence unrepresentable”, and that, however, “it never represents a power of the laws 
that is creative, generative, undetermined that inhabits the living itself; a power of the 
singularity differentiating itself from the forms it takes on.”80 Here lies the true change 
that governance has imposed – especially in Europe – in the legal field, thoroughly dis-
rupting the institutional structure of ‘the modern’.
What juridical Strategy for Governance?
In the institutional changes taking place in recent decades, states have been protagonists 
as much as victims. On the one hand, they have contributed to the increasing liberalization 
p. 16. Also see L. Bazzicalupo, Il governo delle vite.  Biopolitica ed economia, Laterza, Roma-Bari, 2006 and Politica Rappre-
sentazioni e tecniche di governo, Roma, Carocci, 2013.
77. F. Mancuso, Le ‘verità’ del diritto, p. 81.
78. L. Bazzicalupo, ‘Le linee mobili di confine nella normatività sociale e la indeterminatezza delle procedure’, in A. Tucci 
(ed.), Disaggregazioni, pp. 29-46.
79. M. Foucault, Sécurité, territoire, population. 
80. L. Bazzicalupo, “Le linee mobili di confine nella normatività sociale e la indeterminatezza delle procedure”, p. 43. Italics 
in the text.
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of legal and economic life through a series of reforms, laying the foundations of a system of 
laws à la carte that encourages increasingly widespread processes of forum shopping, shop-
ping law and competition between different jurisdictions.81 Sassen has spoken of ‘denation-
alization’ precisely to indicate the tendency of states to “reorient their particular policy work 
or broader state agendas toward the requirements of the global economy even as they con-
tinue to be coded as national.”82 On the other hand, while states were gradually being de-na-
tionalized, the concept of rule of law was being internationalized. Its new use turned it into 
an institutional brand expendable on the global plane for the protection of rights and even 
for the protection of the market,83 sometimes leading, rather paradoxically, to situations of 
lawlessness.84 So, some of the elements of the rule of law are either imposed by international 
organizations on to the weak states, or become the object of a ‘transplant’ made in exchange 
of economic benefits.85
The juridical strategy of governance requires the combination of a large number of 
legal codes in order to provide legal instruments that adapt to specific and increasingly 
different situations. The obfuscation of the primacy of law, with the view of entrusting 
many of its tasks to other legal instruments more capable of meeting the needs of a 
changing and fluid normativity, was inevitable. Such a change was mainly due to func-
tional reasons. The demands coming from an internationalized market and from com-
plex societies could not be met by rigid, predefined and centralized legal instruments 
– as those produced by the European states. There was, moreover, a discrepancy be-
tween the now ‘global’ extent of problems and dynamics and the ‘territorial’ scope of 
legislation. Finally, there was a temporal need, since long legislation processes were in-
compatible with the speed of the market.86 But even political reasons required the use 
of legal instruments detached from the state and its legislation – tools that were lacking 
the strong symbolic meanings and the public resonances weighing down and slowing 
the legislation. More generally, variegated and agile legal instruments, made up of parts 
each capable of satisfying the specific needs of the different social groups, were required. 
81. See: A. Zoppini (ed.), Concorrenza tra ordinamenti giuridici, Laterza, Roma-Bari, 2003, A. Plaia (ed.), La competizione 
tra ordinamenti giuridici, Giuffrè, Milano, 2007, and F. Viola, La concorrenza tra gli ordinamenti e il diritto come scelta, Edi-
toriale Scientifica, Napoli, 2008. Also M. Gnes, La scelta del diritto. Concorrenza tra ordinamenti, arbitraggi, diritto comune 
europeo, Giuffrè, Milano, 2004. 
82. S. Sassen, Territory, Authority, Rights, p. 223, and pp. 230 and ff. 
83. G. Palombella, È possibile una legalità globale? Il rule of law e la governance del mondo, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2010.
84. U. Mattei, L. Nader, Plunder: When the rule of law is illegal, Blackwell, Oxford, 2008. 
85. See, on this, G. Ajani, “Navigatori e giuristi. A proposito del trapianto di nozioni vaghe”, in V. Bertorello (ed.), Io com-
paro, tu compari, egli compara. Che cosa, come, perché?, Giuffré, Milano, 2013, pp. 3-20.
86. See F. Ost, Le temps du droit, Odile Jacob, Paris, 1999. Also M. R. Ferrarese, Il diritto al presente, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2002. 
On the new spatial-temporal order, see S. Sassen, Territory, Authority, Rights, pp. 378 and ff.
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The need was felt for a re-orientation, through institutional mechanisms of ‘disaggre-
gation’, which rendered possible for the legal relationships to no longer be construed 
around ‘territories’ or people’. It was necessary, in other words, to seek dynamic legal 
solutions capable of moving in-between different legal spaces and orders, influencing 
each other, taking on different forms and even overcoming the boundary between public 
and private. 
If the framework of contemporary global legality offers the viewer a remarkable 
variety of ways of being of the law,87 governance processes contribute not only to enrich 
the picture, but also to connote its meaning by producing its own legal models. For 
example, besides the mode of ‘government’, other traditional juridical modes based on 
‘factuality’ seem to remerge,88 such as “hidden hands, habits, patterned behavior, and 
cultural mores.”89 In a context that abandons the rigor of clear conceptual distinctions 
and general and abstract characteristics, even Europeans return to legal mores and other 
forms of ius non scriptum90 to respond to “complex conflict situations that cannot be 
managed hierarchically and in a centralistic way.”91 Supiot refers to neo-feudal charac-
teristics as specific elements of the current legal context and of governance phenomena 
characterizing it.92 Even the soft law widely adopted in Europe,93 by directly contradicting 
the notion of “law command” evoked by Austin as well as Kelsen’s idea of “sanction” 
– two concepts that belonged to the European ‘punitive’ language94 – represents an 
epochal transition.
Here, we wish to draw attention upon two other important modes used by gover-
nance: contract law and judge-made law. These two less visible modes, belonging to the 
87. On this, M. R. Ferrarese, Prima lezione di diritto globale, Laterza, Roma-Bari 2012.
88. On factual law, see P. Grossi, L’ordine giuridico medievale, and Id., “Diritto, globalizzazione, scienza giuridica”, in Foro 
italiano, 5, 2002. Also see, M.R. Ferrarese, Le istituzioni della globalizzazione. Diritto e diritti nella società transnazionale, Il 
Mulino, Bologna, 2000; M. Vogliotti, Tra fatto e diritto. Oltre la modernità giuridica, Giappichelli, Torino, 2007; R. Marra, 
“Per una scienza di realtà del diritto (contro il feticismo giuridico)”, in Materiali per una storia della cultura giuridica, n. 
2, 2008.
89. On the question of polycentrism and polyarchy, see K. J. Holsti, “Governance without Government: Poliarchy in Nine-
teenth-Century European International Politics”, in J.N. Rosenau, E.-O. Czempiel (eds.), Governance without Government, 
p. 32. 
90. S. Mader, Ius non scriptum, Editoriale scientifica, Napoli, 2011. Also see S. M. Carbone, Il diritto non scritto nel commer-
cio internazionale. Due modelli di codificazione, Editoriale scientifica, Napoli, 2012.
91. C. Joerges, “Integrazione attraverso la de-giuridicizzazione? Un intervento interlocutorio”, in M. Blecher et al. (eds.), 
Governance, società civile e movimenti sociali, Ediesse, Roma, 2009, p. 45.
92. A. Supiot, Homo juridicus: Essai sur la fonction anthropologique du Droit, Seuil, Paris, 2005.
93. L. Selden, Soft Law in European Community Law, Hart, Oxford, 2004. Also, D.M. Trubek-L. G. Trubek, “Hard and Soft 
Law in the Construction of Europe: The Role of the Open Method of Coordination”, in European Law Journal, 11, 2005, 
pp. 343-364; G. Bronzini, “The Social Dilemma of European Integration”, and S. Sacchi, ‘Governance e coordinamento 
aperto delle politiche sociali’, both in M. Ferrera, M. Giuliani (eds.), Governance e politiche dell’Unione europea, Il Mulino, 
Bologna, 2008.
94. M. Foucault, La société punitive. Cours au Collège de France. 1972-1973, Seuil-Gallimard, Paris, 2013.
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legal vocabulary of modernity, significantly contribute to give governance a legal physiog-
nomy. They respond perfectly well to the idea of ‘soft revolution’, a scheme that operates 
through implied, indirect and partial rather than explicit, direct and all-encompassing 
reforms. It is no coincidence that their importance and the number and significance of 
their tasks have significantly increased in today’s globalized world. The strong presence 
of different types of contracts and of judge-made law also responds to the need for legal 
forms that bear little political connotation, variable and capable of different combi-
nations between the public and private parts. Jurisdiction and contract may allow for 
less restrictive and less defined rules than statutes. Moreover, they are legal methods of 
composition capable of reconciling and balancing different interests. They also allow 
for a greater feasibility in temporal terms. Whereas the law was projected into the fu-
ture, a future it tended to shape rigidly, governance enjoys a greater feasibility over time. 
It might correspond to the short-termism of economic life, and at the same time might 
rapidly correct those legal responses that fail to work properly. Contract and judiciary 
law both have the necessary elements to become real forms of ‘contract governance’ and 
‘judicial governance’ that is to work as responding to public issues.95 In order to meet the 
various demands of governance, contract and judicial law, while continuing to survive in 
their typical form, have nonetheless undergone profound changes that make them more 
difficult to relate to the original model developed in the European states. Beyond the 
‘typical’ form, contract and judiciary law have also been variously reproduced, even 
giving rise to apocryphal versions of the original model. This has taken place in order 
to respond to the changing needs of different kinds of subjects, and to adapt to the 
global dimension of the issues at stake. Two references will suffice to give an idea of 
these changes. With regard to contracts, we range from the importance of the lex mer-
catoria in the globalized world96 – which is nothing more than a modeling of contract 
usages for international trade purposes – to the many outsourcing contracts – through 
which states and other public institutions bestow on private subjects various tasks and 
responsibilities which in the past were considered to be public.97 With regard to judicial 
95. On governance “by contract” there is a vast literature. See the special issued of the Indiana Journal of Global Legal Stu-
dies, 14, 2007, on ‘Governing Contracts. Public and Private Perspective’, and the special issue of the Law and Contemporary 
Problems, 2, 2013 on ‘The Public Dimension of Contract: Contractual Pluralism Beyond Privity’. On these two forms of 
governance, see my book La governance tra politica e diritto.
96. See F. Galgano, La globalizzazione nello specchio del diritto, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2003; F. Galgano, F. Marrella, Diritto 
del commercio internazionale, Cedam, Padova, 2011; F. Marrella, La nuova lex mercatoria. Principi Unidroit e usi nei 
contratti del commercio internazionale, Cedam, Padova, 2004. Also see M.R. Ferrarese, Diritto sconfinato, pp. 76 and ff. 
97. See, for example, S. Chesterman, A. Fisher (eds.), Private Security, Public Order: The Outsourcing of Public Services and Its 
Limits, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009; Martha Minow, Jody Freeman (eds.), Government by Contract: Outsourcing 
and American Democracy, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Mass.), 2009. 
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governance, we might refer not only to the expansion of different types of international 
courts,98 but also to the tasks they perform, including law-making functions.99 It is also 
worth mentioning that the judicial formula has also had an impact on a number of pri-
vate dispute resolutions, such as arbitration, mediation by ‘quasi-judicial’ agencies that 
perform crucial tasks in today’s world.100
To sum up, the requirements of governance promote the combination of a large num-
ber of legal regulations, so that instruments capable of adapting to the specificity and to 
the variability of concrete situations may become available. The variability of regulations 
may refer to the degree of formality of the law (encompassing the social, the private, the 
public/private, the public, etc…), or might be of spatial kind (ranging to the local, regional, 
national, international, supra- and trans-national level). 
Governance and ‘Strategic’ Legal Forms 
Contract law and judge-made law might be thought of as two heirs sharing the legacy 
of legislation, dispersing the abstractness and generality of rules as well as the theological 
nature of law itself. Inspired by the ‘here and now’ principle, they are far removed from 
any ‘political theology’ and from any other form of transcendence.101 In fact, the law of 
governance consists of rules that have no dogmatic character; they no longer come from 
‘elsewhere’. They are, on the contrary, a product of the actions of competing individuals 
and groups motivated by specific goals and interests. Above all, judicial and contract law 
have become crucial in today’s world for their ability to adapt in a twofold way to the 
ongoing tendency towards privatization. On the one hand, they provide an important 
role to private subjects, albeit each in different ways. On the other, both are capable 
of promoting and satisfying the ‘legal entrepreneurship’ of subjects, something typical of 
American history and that corresponds to the economic nature that global capitalism 
has forced onto institutions.102 
98. Cassese remarks that in the last few decades international jurisdictional organisms have grown from six to more than 
twenty, while there ten ‘almost jurisdictional’ organisms. See S. Cassese, Global Polity.
99. On the point, M. Shapiro, A. Stone Sweet, On Law, Politics, and Judicialization, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002, 
and S. Cassese, I tribunali di Babele. I giudici alla ricerca di un nuovo ordine globale, Donzelli, Roma, 2009. 
100. See M. Shapiro, Courts: A Comparative and Political Analysis, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1981; B. 
Caplan-E.P. Stringham, “Privatizing the Adjudication of Disputes”, in Theoretical Inquiries in Law, vol. 9, 2008, consulted 
on line on 1 February 2014 at http://www.bepress.com/til/default/vol9/iss2/art8. Also see H. Muir-Watt, “Economie de la 
justice et arbitrage international”, in Revue de l’Arbitrage, 3, 2008, pp. 389-418.
101. A. Supiot, Homo juridicus, pp. 92 and ff.
102. On the economic penchant of global law, see my entry “Globalizzazione”, in Enciclopedia delle scienze sociali, Istituto 
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The transposition of the ‘language of interest’ in the legal field takes place thanks to 
the growing importance of contract and judicial law, which assign a direct role to sub-
jects and reward their dynamism and interactive abilities.103 In other words, and refer-
ring back to Elster, it might be said that judge-made law and contractual dynamics both 
make use of the language of ‘negotiation’,104  and contemplate ‘strategic’ forms of action. 
This regards actors acting in situations of mutual dependence, each one trying to read 
the moves of the others in response to their own. In fact, every actor is pursuing his own 
selfish purposes through a competitive interaction with the other parts, a process that 
has been analyzed by game theory.105 As it is known, such ‘games’ even contemplate the 
possibility that individuals resort to ‘threats’, misrepresentations, false statements and 
other strategies that belong to the repertoire of war in order to challenge the counter-
part and eventually win. In a way, in the forms of strategic action the subjects no longer 
obey a ‘command’. On the contrary, they are encouraged to act so as to produce legal 
results (sentences, contracts, etc...) in line with their own aims, that is, the maximiza-
tion of utility and affirmation of their own interests. With reference to the game theory 
framework, it might be said that the rules of governance are no longer supported by a 
‘parametric rationality’ but by a ‘strategic rationality’.106
While legislative law pretended to offer a single, coherent solution, a unique and 
generalized response to a specific problem or a given social demand, the rules emerging 
from contracts and court decisions are strongly influenced by the competitive envi-
ronment that generates them and by the skill and strategic capabilities of the parties 
partaking to the competition. They represent contingent and particular responses that 
cannot be immediately generalized and may not be immediately applied to other situa- 
tions. Strategic rationality also affects public law, which is also drawn towards forms 
of strategic action and is subject to economic analysis.107 These strategic modes have 
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105. D. M. Kreps, Game Theory and Economic Modelling, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1990. For a useful introduction, 
offered from the perspective of political theory, see G. Rusconi, Scambio, minaccia, decisione. Elementi di sociologia politica, 
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Hobbes e Hume, Feltrinelli, Milano, 1994. 
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gradually gained importance, while sectors of ‘public’ law have been to judicial devices 
– often identifiable as so many forms of governance.
The emphasis on the strategic nature of the subjects’ actions, especially in the con-
text of judicial and contractual governance, reflects a strong depletion of the regulatory 
horizon of law itself. The notion of legality,108 largely deprived of the guiding light of 
legislation, is today more than ever a ‘myth’.109 It sometimes takes refuge under the ‘light 
constitutional cloak’,110 which refers to a ‘network’111 or to a ‘fabric’ made of various 
auctoritates and rationes.112 This is especially true with reference to the international 
scenario, where states and other various international structures are engaged, within 
a contractual framework, in collaborating and competing with one another. Conse-
quently, the notion of legality is subject to challenges and forms of exploitation while 
performing functions that limit power in the name of rights.113 In legal relations, the 
crucial weight of interests and the turn towards strategic rationality may seem to con-
tradict the constitutional turn that characterizes our own time. Yet rights and interests 
are the great combination buttressing the political and institutional organization based 
on governance.114 The imbalance between these two components also represents the 
imbalance between normative and strategic attitude in current legal relations. 
All this leads us to reconsider Weber’s prediction that capitalism would always rely 
on the “complete calculability of the functioning of public administration and law”,115 as 
a condition to ensure “the highest degree of formal calculability.”116 On the contrary, it is 
in a spectrum of extremely differentiated choices, methods, practices and legal rules, in 
accordance with different criteria and rationalities, that today’s capitalism reserves the 
right to make its own decisions depending on the circumstances. Governance, in this 
great indeterminacy, represents a vast reservoir for this extreme juridical differentiation.
108. The literature on the issue of legality is constantly growing. See, for example, M. Vogliotti, “Legalità”, in Enciclopedia 
del diritto, Giuffrè, Milano, 2013.
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onore di Lorenza Carlassare.  Il diritto costituzionale come regola e limite al potere, Jovene, Napoli, 2009, pp. 257-280.
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